Status: 104 capabilities shipped — 20 GA, 84 Beta. Enforcement runs in monitor-only mode by default, and an external penetration test is required before the estate plane goes to production. Read the honest status →
Trust & assurance

A security product should be the one you can check

This page states what is true today, including the parts that are inconvenient. A platform that holds brokered privileged access to your entire estate has to be evaluated on evidence, not adjectives.

Honest status

What we would tell you before you asked

Pending External penetration test

The estate plane carries brokered privileged access to your whole fleet. Its own module manifest sets external_pentest_required_before_production: true, and that test has not yet happened. We treat it as a release gate rather than a nice-to-have.

Pending Certifications

No SOC 2 or ISO certification is held today. The compliance module continuously collects the evidence those audits need — for you and for us — but evidence is not a certificate and we will not imply otherwise.

By default Enforcement is off

Segmentation enforcement ships in monitor-only mode. Programming a firewall, converging a cloud security group, applying a NetworkPolicy or broadcasting policy to a third-party enforcement point are all refused until an operator deliberately sets USCP_ENFORCEMENT_MODE=enforce. Rollback is never gated.

Stated per capability GA vs Beta

20 capabilities are GA; 84 are Beta — shipped with real logic and tests, pending pre-production hardening. The split is published in the product itself at /.well-known/api-capabilities, not just in marketing.

Not yet measured Scale envelope

No workload-count ceiling is quoted, because none has been measured on production-shaped hardware. The requirement is that the envelope is measured and published per deployment — an invented number would be exactly the kind of claim this page exists to avoid.

Verified Tenant isolation

Postgres row-level security is FORCE-enabled on every tenant table, and the runtime connects as a NOSUPERUSER / NOBYPASSRLS role so the database enforces isolation rather than application code remembering to. There is a CI test that proves it as that restricted role.

How the platform protects itself

Properties, not policies

Things that are true because of how it is built, rather than because of a document saying they should be.

Operators never hold secrets

Credentials are stored as sealed envelopes and injected at connect time. There is no API that returns a secret in plaintext, and external PAM systems are dereferenced at injection rather than copied in.

Recording cannot be turned off

Every brokered privileged session is recorded and command-mediated, with a dangerous-command denylist and four-eyes on estate-wide actions. The highest-value target in this architecture is the platform itself, and it is built accordingly.

Blast radius is bounded

Estate-wide actions run staged — canary, then ring, then full — rate-limited per channel, with a global kill switch and per-target circuit breakers. A bad policy cannot brick the estate in one command.

Nothing fabricates data

Telemetry surfaces with no real source return an honest empty state, never plausible-looking synthetic rows. Sample data exists for demos and is always tagged synthetic: true. A posture score with no evidence reports unknown, not 100.

Egress is guarded by construction

Every outbound call the platform makes on your behalf goes through an SSRF guard: loopback, link-local and cloud-metadata addresses are unreachable, DNS is bounded, and resolved IPs are pinned so rebinding cannot slip past the check.

The supply chain is verifiable

Signed releases with SBOM, CBOM, VEX and SLSA provenance, plus a reproducible build: build it twice and the digests match. A CBOM deadline gate fails the release if a crypto primitive is past its deprecation date.

Sovereignty

Your data, your region, your key

Region residency

Data stays in the region you pin. A sovereignty topology API reports exactly which regions hold what, so the answer to a residency question is a query rather than an email thread.

Customer lockbox

Vendor access to your data requires your approval, per request, with a default-deny on no response for restricted data. Approvals and denials are both audited.

Hold-your-own-key

With HYOK enabled, revoking your key grant renders your data undecryptable by us. That is a mechanism, not a promise — and the redaction proof-pack machinery is what demonstrates it.

Air-gap, fully

Every capability works with zero egress, including licensing via signed offline bundles. No telemetry, no credential and no estate data ever transits a vendor endpoint.

Vendor continuity

Source and key escrow with a continuity licence path: if the vendor disappears, the frozen build keeps serving licensed capabilities with anti-piracy lockout suspended and no phone-home.

Exit is a feature

Self-service export, portability and erasure are first-class functions. Consolidation should not become lock-in.

Technical due diligence

There is a binding specification behind all of this, a documented threat model with a CI gate that fails when a trust boundary lacks a mitigation, and per-incident runbooks. Ask and we will walk your team through the parts that matter to you.

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